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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000177

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TAGS: [EPET](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [KU](#) [OIL](#) [SECTOR](#)
SUBJECT: CENTCOM TEAM ASSESSES SECURITY OF CRITICAL ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE

REF: KUWAIT 00150

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d, g)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: At the invitation of Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC), the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation subsidiary responsible for all downstream oil operations, the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) facilitated a CENTCOM-led multi-disciplinary vulnerability assessment of the area in and around Kuwait's refineries and export terminals in the Shuaiba-Ahmadi industrial zone from 1-4 February. (Comment: CENTCOM has significant assets and personnel located in the port area, and any industrial or terrorist incident at the refineries or port would directly impact DOD forces in the surrounding area. End comment.) The CENTCOM (CCJ3) team's preliminary findings indicate that while Kuwait has made noteworthy improvements in the security of its critical energy infrastructure, there are still significant areas of concern that need to be addressed. The assessment team noted recent improvements implemented by KNPC including: construction of robust three-layer perimeter fencing, installation of a comprehensive CCTV system, utilization of thorough employee background checks, and development of comprehensive emergency response plans.

¶2. (C/NF) Remaining deficiencies include: lack of explosive detection equipment at gates, no armed quick reaction force on site, inadequate employee access control systems, insufficient detection and interdiction capability in the maritime security zone, inadequate protection for offshore facilities, and a lack of unified command. (Note: Security responsibilities are divided between Interior Ministry and KNPC security personnel who each report through distinct chains of command. End note.) The team briefed its preliminary findings to KNPC Deputy Managing Director Hussain Ismail, his security managers, and his private security consultant, after providing a separate brief to Embassy personnel. Ismail was deeply engaged in the discussion of the team's findings. He recognized that more work needs to be done and seemed to take the team's major recommendations on board, although he noted that some recommendations, such as arming his private security personnel, were beyond his area of control. Ismail requested a copy of the team's final report, which should be completed by mid-March. End summary.

CENTCOM Invited to Assess Security of Refineries, Terminals

¶3. (C/NF) A team from CENTCOM's Joint Security Office Forward (CCJ3) was scheduled to visit Kuwait for a regular country-wide force protection assessment in early February to

include the area around Shuaiba Navy Base (the U.S. sea port of debarkation). Global Village Strategies Executive Director John Bodinnar, the primary security consultant to the Kuwait oil companies, persuaded Hussain Ismail, Deputy Managing Director of KNPC, to request through Post NCIS Resident Agency that the CENTCOM team also assess the security in and around Kuwait's refineries and export terminals in the Shuaiba-Ahmadi industrial zone. This zone contains all three of Kuwait's refineries as well as its primary export terminals for both crude and refined products.

Kuwait produces about 915,000 bpd of refined products (750,000 bpd for export) and approximately 2.5 million bpd of crude (1.7 million bpd for export). Bodinnar explained that he hoped to use the CENTCOM assessment as leverage to reinforce his security recommendations to KNPC. Since any major incident at the refinery and/or export terminals would likely have a direct impact on DOD forces and facilities at Shuaiba Navy Base, CENTCOM agreed to conduct the assessment. (Note: Because the request for this assessment went from KNPC through its consultant to DOD, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation Security Manager Ali Al-Obaid was not directly involved in the assessment or the outbrief.)

14. (C/NF) The areas assessed by the 18-person CENTCOM team from 1-4 February included: physical security, communications and sensors, infrastructure and logistics, safety and hazardous materials, medical response, plans and training, and construction of facilities. The team noted a number of recent improvements implemented by KNPC including: construction of robust three-layer perimeter fencing, installation of a comprehensive CCTV system, utilization of thorough employee background checks, and development of comprehensive emergency response plans. The team also noted that KNPC was taking initial steps to create a more robust

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maritime security force to complement the limited coverage currently provided by the Kuwait Coast Guard.

Several Vulnerabilities Identified, Recommendations Made

15. (C/NF) The team highlighted the following areas of concern:

- No explosive detection measures employed at vehicle entry gates
- No armed quick reaction force on site (By regulation, only Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel can be armed. Armed MOI personnel are currently responsible for perimeter security, but unarmed private security personnel cover security within the facilities. In responding to any major security incident inside the perimeter, KNPC security would have to call MOI and wait for them to arrive on the scene.)
- Inadequate employee area access control (Once inside the perimeter, all employees have unfettered access to all areas.)
- No designation of critical assets within the facilities
- Inadequate vehicle standoff around vital assets
- Not enough personnel trained in first aid
- No chemical/biological drills conducted since 2003
- Access badges easy to duplicate/counterfeit
- Only four boats to cover a maritime exclusion zone of 120 sq. miles
- No armed guards on sea isles and loading piers
- Limited capability to detect and interdict small boats and other waterborne threats
- Divided security responsibilities, poor integration, and separate chains of command and communication between KNPC and MOI

16. (C/NF) The key recommendations were to:

- Expand the internal security force to include perimeter and access control and give it lethal force capability
- Station armed personnel at sea isles and piers
- Identify and restrict access to critical areas
- Increase the number and frequency of maritime patrols
- Construct barrier systems to protect exposed pipelines

- Employ more trained medical personnel

Kuwait Petroleum Receptive, Eager for Final Report

17. (C/NF) At the KNPC outbrief on 4 February, Hussain Ismail thanked the team for its work and engaged in active discussion with both the team leader and team members about specific points. He demonstrated awareness of many of the deficiencies identified and seemed eager to take most of the recommendations on board. Ismail noted, however, that he has little control over the Ministry of Interior, and that there was nothing he could do about arming KNPC security personnel without authorization from the MOI. Ismail pointedly asked the team leader if he thought that the waterside and offshore facilities were the most critical area of vulnerability. The team leader acknowledged this, but suggested that the sonar system KNPC was considering would be ineffective due to water depth and salinity. He said that KNPC should focus on combating the threat from small boats rather than the threat from swimmers. Ismail seemed surprised at the recommendation that the two security forces be merged, believing that one should serve as a deterrent and the other should respond to incidents, but he accepted the team's arguments regarding the importance of unified command and control. Ismail said he looked forward to reading the team's final report in detail. The team expects to deliver this report to the Embassy in 4-6 weeks. The Embassy will then determine the appropriate deliverables to KNPC.

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